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THE PLURALIST GAME
FRANCIS CANAVAN*
The United States is a pluralist society. That is a commonplace and is taken as
stating the problem to which the American relation between religion and the law is
supposed to furnish the solution. The general principle of that relationship is an
official governmental neutrality among all creeds, one that respects all beliefs but
grants no favor to any of them. The name of the game is pluralism and the rules
of the game can be summed up in one word: neutrality.
Unfortunately, however, our pluralism keeps changing. Today's pluralism is no
longer that of even a quarter of a century ago. As the divisions on matters of
fundamental belief become more and more pronounced in our society, the princi-
ple of neutrality becomes more difficult to apply to it.
As recently as 1960, the late John Courtney Murray, S. J., described the religion
clauses of the First Amendment as "the twin children of social necessity, the
necessity of creating a social environment, protected by law, in which men of
differing faiths might live together in peace."' The faiths did indeed differ, and
that fact constituted a political problem. It was also true, however, that all of the
religions that had adherents numerous enough to matter shared a common Judaeo-
Christian tradition. Moreover, it was the respects in which they were substantially
the same, namely, their moral teachings, that were politically significant and made
the living together of their followers in peace a practical possibility. Now we must
take notice of the fact that the differences both in faith and morals are steadily
becoming deeper.
"Disintegration is the defining experience of the culture of modernism," a
young professor at the Harvard Law School has written. 2 This was, to be sure, a
somewhat delphic statement, but a few quotations from other writers will suggest
what he meant by it.
"... [O]ne of the reasons why the novel has suffered so many strange muta-
tions this century," an English literary critic has remarked, "is simply that the old
shared assumptions about the nature of reality-the way of things, the why of
things-have broken down. Increasingly, people are left bewildered at the work-
ings of the world around them." 3 An important reason for this breakdown is the
increasingly successful struggle of the individual self to free itself from the con-
straint of social norms.4 According to the American critic, Lionel Trilling, the
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"particular concern of the literature of the past two centuries has been with the self
in its standing quarrel with culture."
5
A group of sociologists explain in more detail that
modern identity is peculiarly individuated. The individual, the bearer of identity as
the ens realissimum, quite logically attains a very important place in the hierarchy of
values. Individual freedom, individual autonomy and individual rights come to be
taken for granted as moral imperatives of fundamental importance, and foremost
among these individual rights is the right to plan and fashion one's life as freely as
possible. This basic right is elaborately legitimated by a variety of modern ideologies. 6
This view of the individual and his rights has found its way even into the U.S.
Reports, as this passage from the pen of the late Justice Douglas reveals.
Many of [the rights referred to in the Ninth Amendment] in my view come
within the meaning of the term "liberty" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment.
First is the autonomous control over the development and expression of one's intellect,
interests, tastes, and personality.
These are rights protected by the First Amendment and in my view they are
absolute, permitting of no exceptions. 7
Admittedly, Justice Douglas was as thoroughgoing an individualist as ever sat on
the nation's highest bench, and he wrote the above words in a concurring opinion
in which no other Justice joined him. Nonetheless the attitude he expressed
permeates contemporary American society and is shared by many who could not
tell the Ninth Amendment from the First but are convinced that the Constitution
endows them with an armory of absolute rights.
What follows from this degree of individualism has been pointed out by Iredell
Jenkins: "Our skepticism regarding judgments of moral value springs from the
fact that we are uneasy about what man should be; the ideas of freedom and
equality have seduced us into accepting the doctrine of the ultimacy of the individ-
ual, with the result that every man becomes the sole judge of his own good."8
A handful of quotations such as these of itself proves nothing, of course. But it
would be easy to fill a book with passages taken from a wide range of publications
that reveal a growing awareness that the moral and intellectual consensus on which
our society has lived is disintegrating. There is a widely diffused feeling that we are
ceasing to agree even in basic respects on what man should be and how he should
live. In consequence, much to the distress of politicians and political commenta-
tors, moral issues are being injected into law and politics which they would prefer
to keep out. But given the nature of American pluralism today, it is hard to see
how they can be kept out or how our traditional response to "divisive" issues can
continue to work.
For we are no longer a pluralist society composed of a multitude of religious
5. Quoted in Kluckhohn, Have There Been Discernable Shifts in American Values in the Past Genera-
tion? in E. MORISON, ed., THE AMERICAN STYLE 196 (1958).
6. P. BERGER, B. BERGER & H. KELLNER, THE HOMELESS MIND: MODERNIZATION AND CONSCIOUS-
NESS 79 (1973).
7. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210-11 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
8. Jenkins, Book Review, 16 AM. J. OF JUR. 302, 316 (1971).
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branches that sprang from a common stem. Lush as the variety of creeds in
America has always been, by far the greater part of them held the Bible in
common and in most respects taught substantially the same moral code. Historians
will be quick to point out how large the number of the unchurched was even in
colonial times, how soon the influence of the Enlightenment made itself felt on
these shores and how much indifferentism and outright skepticism coexisted al-
most from the beginning with religious faith. They are right, too, but only up to a
point.
There never was a religious Golden Age in this country, or in any other for
that matter. Nor was there ever a static period in which the religious situation in
America stood still for decades. But recognition of these facts should not blind us
to the extent to which a common religious and moral tradition perdured through
centuries of change and fragmentation. As late as 1931 the U.S. Supreme Court
could declare: "We are a Christian people . .."9 It is a measure of the distance we
have come in the last half-century that one cannot imagine the Court saying that
today.
Our pluralism has increased and is increasing. This is, to be sure, a not
unexpected development. It means only that a profound cultural shift that began
centuries ago on the other side of the Atlantic has finally eroded what remained of
the earlier religious and moral tradition in the minds of multitudes of Americans.
It has incidentally also left millions of other Americans with the feeling that they
are now strangers in their own land. Today we are forced to ask whether the
picture of an impartial state presiding with what Chief Justice Burger has called
"benevolent neutrality' ' 1° over the peaceful coexistence of a multitude of sects still
fits the facts to a serviceable degree. In the face of the new pluralism that is
emerging we must inquire how realistic is the ideal of neutrality as we have
understood it up to now.
The neutral state, as we have inherited it, is the liberal state. The historical
genesis of liberalism and the state it formed is no simple thing. It was the product
of many factors, and what they were and how they interacted is a matter of
considerable dispute among scholars. But for our present purpose it is safe to say
that liberalism was a response to the situation created by two great movements, the
Reformation and the Enlightenment. One of these replaced the unity of medieval
Christendom with a multiplicity of churches. The other, as Lester G. Crocker has
put it, was "the beginning of the godless age"' ii in which Christianity in any form
eventually ceased to be the common religion of Western culture.
An early response to the religious divisions that followed the Reformation was
crystallized in the phrase, cujus regio, ejus religio. That is to say, the government of
a country would determine its religion and require all inhabitants to conform to it.
But since this policy, far from ending strife, made control of the government an
9. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931).
10. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
11. Presidential Address of Crocker in L. MILIC, ed., THE MODERNITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTU-
RY XViii (STUDIES IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CULTURE, Vol. 1) (1971).
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object to be gained by armed force, the solution that eventually prevailed was to
take religion out of politics.
Doing this did not necessarily require a formal "separation of Church and
State" such as was established in the United States by the First Amendment. Great
Britain has shown that a formal religious establishment can become compatible
with a high degree of religious liberty. But it did require that a man's freedom to
follow his own religion or no religion should not be denied or seriously burdened
by governmental action.
Freedom of religion was but one instance of liberalism's instinct for taking
neuralgic issues out of politics. Liberal politics must be confined to matters of
secondary importance like war and taxes (curious as it may sound to say that)
because bitterly though citizens may disagree about these things, they do not
usually take up arms against each other about them as they did over religion. Not
only religious issues, however, but all issues that engender more emotion than the
political system can bear must be excluded from politics. Preeminent among these
are moral issues because they both deeply affect the way people live and are closely
connected with their more general fundamental beliefs, be these religious or
secularist.
Liberal government therefore is neutral government. But to make this assertion
only raises the question: neutral about what? The answer to that question turns out
to be itself a political and even a moral issue. Robert Dahl, for example, has
discussed a number of ways in which people who believe in political equality, and
therefore in democracy, may yet protect themselves against majority decisions
which they regard as overbearing and oppressive. One of them is this:
... sometimes a matter about which we disagree can be turned over so completely
to the domain of personal choice that no generally binding decision is required.
Two familiar issues of this kind are the religious instruction, if any, to be given
one's own children and whether they are to be educated in public or private
schools. A few years ago the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed that the
use of contraceptive devices falls in this domain. One might call this alternative a
solution by Autonomous Decisions. 12
We may thus seem to have an answer to our question. Government should be
neutral about matters that belong in the area of Autonomous Decisions. But Dahl
immediately points out that the boundaries of this area are themselves a subject of
continuing controversy. He explains:
Judgments as to the appropriate domain of Autonomous Decisions are constantly
changing. Efforts to define the domain once and for all have always failed. Thus in
the United States, owning and driving a machine that emits exhaust fumes is
rapidly moving out of the domain of Autonomous Decisions to regulation by
collective decision ... , while sexual practices among consenting adults are moving
from collective regulation to the domain of individual choice. 13
Even more important is the following consideration:
To be sure, once we have agreed that a particular matter belongs within the
domain of Autonomous Decisions, the possibility of conflict between minority and
12. R. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY 19 (1970).
13. Id., at 19-20.
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majority is eliminated with respect to that matter. But to determine what remains in
or out of the domain of Autonomous Decisions requires a collective decision;
decisions of this kind are often a source of very profound conflict. . . . What
properly belongs within the domain of Autonomous Decisions or Consumers' Choice
has been a perpetual point of controversy between majorities and minorities. 14
What belongs in the area of Autonomous Decisions is, therefore, a question that
requires a public and political decision. In making such a decision the people,
through their representatives, take a public stand on what they will leave to
individual choice and what they will subject to legal regulation. Leaving a matter to
individual choice is as much a public decision as deciding to regulate it and implies
some public scheme of values quite as much as a decision to regulate does.
In practice, of course, the controversy over a question of this kind gets such
settlement as it does get through a political process in which expediency and
rhetoric play a large part. Slogans such as "You can't legislate morality" and "No
group has a right to impose its morality on others" are freely used. If at all
possible, the First Amendment is invoked on the absolute necessity of separating
Church and State. In fact, however, the size and (perhaps even more important)
the financial power of the groups involved, and the importance that both sides
attach to the values at stake, have more to do with the way in which the dispute is
settled than does any appeal to principle.
The American people in the nineteenth century felt few qualms about banning
polygamy throughout the United States, even though John Stuart Mill had warned
them against doing so in Utah. Since the Mormons had exiled themselves to a
remote and previously uninhabited territory in order to practice polygamy, he
said, "it is difficult to see on what principles but those of tyranny they can be
prevented from living there under what laws they please, provided they commit no
aggression on other nations and allow perfect freedom of departure to those who
are dissatisfied with their ways." 15 But the Mormons were few in number and
without influence, while on the other hand monogamy was solidly embedded in
the religious and moral beliefs of the great majority of Americans.
The U.S. Supreme Court, as was fitting in a First Amendment case, found a
secular and political reason for upholding the federal law against the practice of
polgamy in the territories. The Court declared that "polygamy leads to the patriar-
chal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in
stationary despotism, while the principle cannot long exist in connection with
monogamy." 16 The ban on polygamy, according to the Court, struck a blow for
political liberty. One may suspect, however, that the Court was in fact reflecting the
moral conscience of the people at large.
Conversely, one may suspect that if the polygamous minority were not so
small-if, say, 45 per cent of Americans believed in polygamy and many of them
wanted to practice it-the Supreme Court (today's if not yesterday's) would find
polygamy to be in the domain of Autonomous Decisions or, as the Court prefers
14. Id., at 24-25.
15. J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY, Bobbs-Merrill Library of Liberal Arts (1956), p. 112-13.
16. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878), citing Lieber, The Mormons: Shall Utah be
Admitted into the Union?, Putnam's Monthly, March 1855, at 225.
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to put it, to be included in the right of privacy. The Court would of course also
have to try to gauge the feelings of the 55 per cent majority who still objected to
polygamy. How strong are their feelings? Will the majority swallow a flat declara-
tion that prohibiting polygamy is beyond the constitutional powers of government?
Or must we take a more gradual approach by finding one anti-polygamy statute
after another vague and overbroad while maintaining that in principle government
may regulate polygamy? These would be difficult and delicate questions to answer.
But one way or another, the Court, along with other agencies of government,
would search for a means of taking the divisive issue of polygamy out of politics.
The reason for doing so would be the practical one of lessening social and
political strife. The principled justification for doing it, however, would be the
neutrality among conflicting beliefs to which government is committed in a liberal
society. But the justification would only raise once again the questions of the
matters about which government ought to be neutral, how far it should go in the
quest for neutrality, and to what extent neutrality is ultimately possible.
We must admit that a liberal society has a permanent bias in favor of neutrality.
The liberal state is founded on no such vision of human excellence as informed
the political theories of Plato and Aristotle, no such hope of earthly and eternal
happiness as inspired the medieval res publica Christiana. The liberal state aims only
at equal liberty for all under impartial general laws. The use that men make of
their liberty and the goals they pursue are for them to decide. Any attempt by
society or its agent, the state, to make the decision for them must be rejected as an
effort by some citizens to impose their conception of excellence, virtue or happi-
ness on others.
The liberal state therefore aims low and attempts only to establish the condi-
tions of ordered liberty in which men can peacefully pursue their essentially
private ends. Such a state obviously never existed in its pure form. The laissez-
faire state of the nineteenth century was probably the closest approach to it in
actuality. It must also be remembered that the implications of the liberal view of
man as a naturally sovereign individual motivated by his subjective concept of his
own interest were worked out only very gradually over a period of several centu-
ries. Liberalism reached its apogee in the Victorian era when it could still be
assumed that ladies and gentlemen had a common code of manners and even of
morals, and when one could still hope-with whatever misgivings-to civilize the
masses through popular education and good literature. The proposal to free the
individual to follow his preferences and to choose his own way of living took
certain built-in checks for granted. It is only today that we begin fully to under-
stand what liberal individualism really implies.
The liberal ideal of governmental neutrality ought to require (and in the
nineteenth century was thought to require) a minimalist conception of the state. A
state which aims at achieving neutrality by leaving to private choice those matters
on which beliefs and values differ should try to do as little as possible. When it
does act, it should do so only in areas of common material concern about which
general agreement can be assumed, e.g., paving the streets and providing protec-
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tion against fires. When it finds it necessary to intervene in matters that transcend
the merely material, it should help people to carry out their own decisions rather
than decide for them.
Thus for example, if it is judged that a liberal democracy needs an educated
citizenry, the state should not run schools but should content itself with obliging
parents to send their children to school and should provide them with the means
of doing so if that is necessary. For, as John Stuart Mill remarked in 1859, "[a]
general State education is a mere contrivance for molding people to be exactly like
one another" and "establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural
tendency to one over the body."'
7
It is true that Mill later changed his mind on this point, and that is not
surprising. He was, after all, one of the heralds of the shift in liberal thought that
took place around the turn of this century and led to the welfare-state liberalism of
the present age. With the advent of the welfare state, the problem of governmental
neutrality clearly becomes more acute. A state that acts vigorously on a number of
fronts to promote people's welfare must have some idea of what their welfare is.
That necessarily implies some conception of what is good for human beings and
what is bad for them. Having such a conception, the state cannot pretend to be
neutral about it.
One can, to be sure, defend the neutrality of welfare liberalism by asserting that
the welfare state does no more than try to guarantee to all citizens the minimum
conditions in which they may effectively pursue their private goals. In a modern
society, the individual needs a basic education, a place in which to live, a job to give
him an income and a pension to support him in old age. Government does not
abandon neutrality by taking action to insure that he has these things, for it leaves
him completely free to think, say, read and view what he pleases, and to act on any
life-plan that does not violate the rights of others.
Preserving this kind of neutrality in a welfare state turns out, however, to be
somewhat more difficult than welfare liberals care to admit. The difficulty is most
obvious in education because of its inevitable intellectual and moral content, though
it by no means appears only there. Forty years ago Alexander Meiklejohn pointed
out the problem in these words:
If, then, political governments are taking the place of the churches in the making
and directing of education it follows that we must ask what are the beliefs and
values which those governments express and represent. The city of New York, or
San Francisco, or Middletown, has schools whose task it is to prepare young people
for living. What do those cities believe about living? What lessons have they to
teach? Does New York City believe anything? Has it any values or convictions out of
which a scheme of teaching may be made?' 8
Does New York City believe anything? One answer to that question, an answer
which seems to find favor with the U.S. Supreme Court, is: No, but New York can
17. MILL, supra note 15, at 129.
18. A. MEIKLEJOHN, EDUCATION BETWEEN Two WORLDS 5 (1942).
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still educate. As Justice Brennan explained in a concurring opinion, the state's
concern in education is simply
an interest in ensuring that all children within its boundaries acquire a minimum
level of competency in certain skills, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic, as
well as a minimum amount of information and knowledge in certain subjects such
as history, geography, science, literature and law.
19
Public education, in Justice Brennan's view, consists solely in imparting skills and
factual information. These constitute objective knowledge which is value-free and
neutral in content. New York, therefore, or any other city can teach them from no
particular point of view and without believing anything about life.
The premise of this position, however, is a distinction between facts and values,
between scientific "knowledge" and religious, philosophical or ethical "faith." But
this distinction itself derives from a particular, sectarian and today much-controverted
theory of the nature of knowledge. Its name is positivism and one can hardly
maintain that positivism is now universally accepted in informed and intelligent circles.
To make it the premise of a theory of education, therefore, is not neutrality.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether Justice Brennan's words accurately
describe what public schools actually do. These schools today teach children about
subjects as diverse as sex and citizenship, history and histology, law and literature.
All of them are no doubt worthy subjects of study. But it requires some exercise of
the imagination to believe that they can be taught merely as sets of objective facts,
without value judgments and without implying criteria of evaluation, decision and
action.
The sincere effort at neutrality would seem to defeat itself. To teadh children,
for example, that they have interesting and complementary sexual anatomies, but
that teacher, being neutral, can say no more about the proper use of them than
that there are differing schools of thought on the question, appears likely to tilt the
balance in favor of regarding sexual conduct as simply a matter of taste and
preference, of no social consequence so long as precautions are taken against
unwanted offspring. Many people today, operating through well-financed organizations
(often, in fact, federally-financed), do advocate that view and try to propagate it in
the schools. But siding with them is presumably not what we mean by neutrality. 20
One can state the problem in more general terms. Decisions on public policy
concern the use of means to achieve social goals. In a society where a strong
consensus on the general goals of policy exists, the decisions need not concern
anything other than the choice of means to the agreed-upon goals. The goals in
turn are agreed upon because they derive from a prevailing view of the nature of
man, of what is good for him and of what his basic social relations ought to be. As
consensus on these matters breaks down, the choice not only of means but of ends
19. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 655 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
20. For a report on sex-education programs in public schools that reveals how thin the pretense of
neutrality often is, see Horner, Is the New Sex Education Going Too Far? The New York Times Magazine,
Dec. 7, 1980, at 137 ff.
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becomes a subject of controversy, and this fact cannot be indefinitely obscured by
appeals to the neutrality of the state and the equality of citizens under the law.
Affirmative action programs, for example, are designed to promote equality.
But they rest upon largely unexamined and uncriticized assumptions about the
nature of the equality to be promoted. The most basic of these assumptions is the
conception, inherited from seventeenth and eighteenth century social contract
theories, of mankind as a multitude of autonomous individual subjects of rights
whose relations with one another and with society are voluntary and contractual.
This conception today underlies the picture of the adult and adolescent population
of the United States as made up of actual or potential jobholders who may, if they
wish, marry and raise children as an avocation, but whose equal access to jobs
without distinction by race, sex, creed, or sexual preference is the overriding
concern of the law.
The point being made here is not that this theory of equality is false, but
merely that it is neither demonstrably true nor universally accepted. The exercise
of human intelligence does not automatically and necessarily commit us to so
radically individualistic a view of human nature or to the kind of equality that
follows from it. Still believing in the basic equality of all human beings, it would be
possible to conceive of man in more communitarian terms and to think of men
and women as persons whose relations flow from their complementary sexual
natures. In this view, differentiation of social roles that took sex into account would
make sense.
Let us push the matter a little farther. The principle that the state may deny to
no person the equal protection of the laws has not been understood to forbid all
legal classifications but only those which are arbitrary and unreasonable. But what
is reasonable? The classic liberal answer was that the allocation of social status and
rewards on the basis of merit, but on no other basis, was reasonable. A man has a
right to what he has earned, disproportionate though it may be to what others get,
but he has a right to no more. But, as Roberto Mangabeira Unger points out, in a
liberal society, belief in meritocracy itself eventually comes under attack.
Every conventional criterion for the allocation of social advantages falls under the
suspicion that it, too, is arbitrary. Even reliance on merit becomes suspect when its
dependence on the distribution of genetic endowments is taken into account, for
people may begin to doubt whether a man's social place should be determined by a
fact of which he is not the author. 21
One may indeed ask why he should be expected to go to the end of the line
when the good things of life are distributed, merely because he was born to poor,
culturally deprived and perhaps genetically inferior parents. Followed all the way
through, Yves Simon explained, this line of questioning leads to the conclusion
that all children should be taken from their parents at birth and raised in state
nurseries, lest one child be more "advantaged" than another.22 Given today's
21. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 172 (1976).
22. Y. SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 225 (1951).
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biological technology, one can dream of the day when children will not be born at
all but will come out of genetic blenders in state hatcheries, so that no child will be
even genetically superior to another.
Simon's answer to this line of argument was that we limit the principle of
equality of opportunity when it begins to destroy the very things for which we
wanted opportunity in the first place: ". . . a policy of equal opportunity begins to
be harmful when it threatens to dissolve the small communities [primarily the
family] from which men derive their best energies in the hard accomplishments of
daily life."
23
But Simon belonged to the school of philosophical realism and believed in an
objectively real common nature of man. He was, in fact, a Thomist, therefore a
sectarian. Yet the opposing and ultimately nominalist school of thought is fully as
sectarian. All doctrines of equality rest upon some philosophy and some concep-
tion of the nature of man. No state can promote equality without consciously or
unconsciously, explicitly or implicitly, adopting one view or another. It has been
the genius of the liberal pluralist society to avoid raising such questions of funda-
mental philosophy so far as possible. But as the issues that surface in debates on
public policy become more profound, avoiding these questions becomes corre-
spondingly less possible. Pretending that they can be dealt with by plain, blunt
common sense without resort to premises of a higher level is at best a refusal to
face the issues. At worst, it is an effort to play the pluralist game with a stacked deck.
Shifting the issues over into the area of Autonomous Decisions also proves to be
no escape. The U.S. Supreme Court tried to do this with the abortion issue in Roe
v. Wade2 4 and subsequent cases 25 by holding that the right to decide on an abortion
belongs only to the expectant mother, advised by her physician, without interfer-
ence by the state, her husband or her parents. Thus, it was alleged, the state
achieved neutrality on the subject of abortion: no woman could by law be required
to have an abortion or prevented from having one, since the Constitution as
interpreted left the decision to her alone.
The import of this holding has at times been exaggerated. For instance, Chief
Circuit Judge Clement Haynsworth, speaking for a three judge federal court, has
said that "the Supreme Court declared the fetus in the womb is neither alive nor a
person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. '2 6 But it is doubtful if
the Supreme Court claimed a power that God Himself might envy, that of making
a live fetus dead merely by declaring it so. The Court's decision, rather, was an
assertion, not that the fetus lacked life, but that the value to be attached to its life
was only what its mother chose to give it. If she wanted a baby, its prenatal life was
a value which the state could protect but only because she wanted it. If she did not
want a child to be born, its life could be destroyed by abortion. That is to say, at
23. Id., at 228-29.
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), Bellotti v. Baird,
428 U.S. 132 (1976).
26. Floyd v. Anders, 440 F. Supp. 535, 539 (D.S.C. 1977).
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least for the first two trimesters, its life had no intrinsic value that the state could
recognize and protect independently of the will of the mother.
The Court therefore did not really achieve neutrality by making abortion a
matter of private choice immune from public control. Instead, it committed the
United States to a value judgment on prenatal life. The same question will arise in
regard to postnatal life when, as seems likely, euthanasia becomes a constitutional
issue. According to the New York Times, it has already become the subject of "an
emotional debate in Britain" occasioned by the publication of a booklet entitled
"How to Die with Dignity" that described various methods of suicide. This debate,
the Times reported, centered on the questions, "Is there a 'right to commit suicide,'
as basic as the right to live? And if there is, is it proper to help people to kill
themselves, either actively or by advising them?
27
The issue thus posed is both basic and unavoidable. The person whose life is to
be terminated by euthanasia wants to die. He therefore claims the right to end his
life, or to have it ended by a doctor, on the premise that the only value of life is a
purely subjective one, and his life is no longer a value to him. The argument
against letting him choose death-when all subsidiary and distracting arguments
about fully informed consent have been settled-must invoke the principle that
human life is a value in itself, an objective human good, that the state exists to
protect. Faced with this issue, the U.S. Supreme Court could not pretend to be
neutral by finding euthanasia to be included in the constitutional right of privacy,
thus making life and death objects of private choice. So to decide would be to
come down on one side of the controversy, that side which holds that life has only
subjective value.
Similarly, arguments for recognition of the civil rights of homosexuals, to the
extent that they are a demand for public acceptance of heterosexuality and homo-
sexuality as separate but equal ways of life, pose an issue to which there is no
neutral answer. This is a demand that the public commit itself to a particular view
of the nature and function of sex in human life. Faced with this demand, the
public and its government cannot take refuge in a specious neutrality by leaving
the matter to individual consciences.
To do so would be a public declaration that in the eyes of society and its laws,
sexual preferences are merely that-personal and subjective preferences of no
objective validity and no public importance. That view may arguably be the correct
one, but it is not a neutral refusal to hold any view at all. Nor, if adopted, would it
succeed in relegating questions of sexual preference to the purely private domain.
Consider, for example, the case of Belmont v. Belmont. A divorced and remar-
ried father applied in the New Jersey Superior Court for a change in the custody
of his children from his former wife to himself on the ground that she was living
in a lesbian relationship deleterious to the welfare of the children. According to the
Family Law Reporter, the court "found him to be suitable as a custodian in all
respects." Nonetheless, it rejected his application and ruled that "the mother is not
27. Borders, Suicide Guide Stirs a Debate in Britain, New York Times, Sept. 28, 1980, at § 1, p. 7, col. 1.
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to be denied custody merely because of her sexual orientation. Her sexual prefer-
ence and her living arrangement with her lover are only two of the many factors
to be examined in determining the best interests of the children . 2.."28 In so
ruling, the court committed the State of New Jersey to the proposition that a
homosexual union is, or can be, as acceptable a one in which to raise children as is
a heterosexual one dignified by matrimony. This is something more than a deci-
sion to leave sexual preferences up to individuals. It is a public stand in regard to
the institution of the family.
Viewed from a certain angle, the ultimate liberal ideal appears to be normlessness.
In its extreme form (which for some curious reason is now regarded as "conserva-
tive"), this ideal is called libertarianism. The most radical brand of libertarianism
holds that there should be no social norms enforced by the state, and indeed no
state to enforce them. The only norms should be those which emerge from the
consent of individuals who voluntarily join a variety of social groups. But all forms
of liberalism, even the most statist, regard the ideal situation as one in which the
individual freely-and, of course, intelligently-sets norms for himself. If regula-
tion is necessary, as most liberals concede and even insist that it is, its ultimate
justification is that it contributes to the individual's freedom to shape his life as he will.
Normlessness, however, turns out to be itself a norm. It is a steady choice of
individual freedom over any other human or social good that conflicts with it, an
unrelenting subordination of all allegedly objective goods to the subjective good of
individual preference. Such a policy does not merely set individuals free to shape
their own lives. It necessarily sets norms for a whole society, creates an environ-
ment in which everyone has to live and exerts a powerful influence on social
institutions.
This is particularly apparent in a welfare state where, for example, the argu-
ment is constantly urged that it is unjust to allow the rich and the middle class to
do what the poor cannot afford to do. The first stage of argument is that the hand
of the law must be withdrawn from an activity found to be included in the right of
privacy. Once it has been established, however, that contraception, abortion, or
divorce, for example, are little or no business of government, the argument moves
into its second stage. These activities are now constitutional rights and, as such, are
presented as positive claims on government. Those who cannot afford to engage in
them with their own resources must be subsidized, so that they may exercise their
constitutional rights as effectively as the more well-to-do. What was originally
withdrawn from the power of government should now, we are told, become an
object of government policy.
The U.S. Supreme Court, as we know, has refused to turn this argument into a
constitutional command.2 9 That does not change the fact that government is under
constant pressure-to which it frequently yields-to use its power to promote or
enforce new norms in the guise of leaving normative decisions to individuals. The
net result is not no norms but different norms and a reshaping of the institutions
of society.
28. Belmont v. Belmont, 6 FLR 2785-86 (N.J. Sup. 1980).
29. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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A similar result would follow even in a classically liberal society that did not
maintain a welfare state. Such a society would not subsidize the exercise of private
rights but it would nonetheless have to make up its mind on the nature and
content of the rights which it would recognize and protect. Merely by making this
decision it would set social norms.
For example, Anglo-American law has always given a privileged position to the
institution of marriage, and to a large though lesser extent it still does so. Marriage
entails obligations and some of them are legally enforceable. But it also entails
rights-economic as well as strictly marital and familial ones-which find a place
in the law in a multitude of ways. Now, the preferred position of marriage creates
social norms. No other sexual relationship, even if tolerated by law, enjoys the
same legal protection and consequent social prestige as marriage. The law discrim-
inates systematically in favor of marriage.
In principle, a liberal society could rectify this discrimination. Doing so would
require reducing marriage to the status of a private contract like any other, to be
entered into and dissolved at will, subject only to the limitations created by the
legitimate interests of other persons that may have arisen from the contract (the
children will always be a problem in even the most liberal Garden of Eden). The
content of the contract, of course, would have to be left to the contracting parties.
It could include provisions for extramarital larks, mnages dL trois and homosexual
as well as heterosexual unions. The only function of the state would be to enforce
the contract while it lasted.
We must ask, however, whether a society that went that far in its quest for
equal freedom for all would have eliminated discrimination and achieved neutrali-
ty. At first glance, it appears that it would have. Individuals would still be free to
contract heterosexual, monogamous and life-long marriages, just as before, and
the state would enforce these contracts, too. All that would have happened would
be the removal of an invidious distinction in favor of one form of sexual union.
But to take this position is implicitly to assert that the only value of marriage is
a purely private one. The best sexual relationship is the one that best pleases the
individuals who participate in it. Their pleasure is the norm because no other
norm is admissible. But accepting that proposition is not normlessness. It is the
clear choice of one basic social norm over all others, a choice which has far-
reaching consequences for all of society.
After all, the Supreme Court had a point when it said in the Mormon polyga-
my case in 1878: "Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is,
nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by
law. Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social ...
obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required to deal."3 °
Since marriage is a highly visible social fact, government must take some attitude
toward it. To regard marriage and the family as the foundation of society, as the
Court did in 1878, is to adopt a particular view of man and society. This view
inevitably becomes the basis of coercive laws, such as those which prohibit bigamy
30. 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).
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and polygamy. But it is an equally particular view of man and society to regard
marriage and its alternatives as matters of purely private concern. If they are so
regarded, then private decisions about them are entitled to protection from inter-
ference and infringement, for example, by laws to prevent landlords from refusing
to rent apartments to couples who wish to cohabit without being married. Either
way, some view concerning sexual relationships gets enforced by the power of law.
What is impossible is to take no view at all and call it neutrality.
A pluralist society must perforce strive to be neutral about many things that
concern its divided citizens. But it cannot be neutral about all of them. If it tries or
pretends to be neutral about certain issues, the pluralist game becomes a shell
game by which people are tricked into consenting to changes in basic social
standards and institutions on the pretense that nothing more is asked of them than
respect for the rights of individuals. Much more, however, is involved: on the
fundamental issues of social life, one side or the other always wins.
To say this leaves unanswered the question, which issues are of fundamental
importance. That is a question which any given society will as a matter of fact
decide for itself. The only point that need be made here is that a society may make
this decision because it must make it. There is no way of avoiding decision since
the ostensible refusal to decide is itself a decision.
Nor is there any neat line that can be drawn between political issues and moral
issues, or between law and morality. As we have said, the decision to leave certain
moral issues to individual choice is a public decision that reflects an underlying
public moral judgment. Public decisions to leave certain matters to individual
consciences may be and often are wise and right, but neutral they are not.
There is also no neat line that can be drawn between religion and morality. The
state, under our Constitution, is not permitted to enforce the Ten Commandments
on the ground that they have been revealed by God. On the other hand, the state
is not barred from enforcing certain principles of the Ten Commandments for the
reason that some of its citizens believe that they have been revealed by God. Which
of the commandments may or should be enforced, to what extent they should be
enforced and by what legal means are open questions for public moral decision.
There is inescapably a public morality-a good one or a bad one-in the sense
of some set or other of basic norms in the light of which the public makes policy
decisions. These norms are moral norms to the extent that they include fundamental
judgments on what is good or bad for human beings, therefore on what it is
permissble or obligatory to do to them or for them. Public morality is a secular
morality inasmuch as it aims only at secular goals, at the welfare of men in this
world. It is not therefore a secularist morality. When discussing the welfare of
human beings in the here and now we are not limited to the vision of man and his
good that happens to be held by those who call themselves secular humanists.
Secular humanism is not the least common denominator of all American beliefs
about human welfare. It is but one sectarian view among many, and any American
is free to believe that he derives from his religion a richer, fuller and more truly
human image of man. He is also free to use it as a basis for the views he advocates
on public policy.
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Leo Pfeffer has announced the Triumph of Secular Humanism, which he seems
to regard as the resolution of the Issues That Divide.1 That victory may or may
not be a fact; one sometimes has the impression that the battle is not over yet. But
if it proves to be the fact, we should at least not delude ourselves about what has
happened. It will not be the advent of a truly neutral state but the replacement of
one view of man, with the ethic and the legal norms based on it, by another view.3 2
In the meantime the Issues That Divide will continue to divide our people ever
more deeply. The pluralist game will continue to be played, of course, because
there is no other game in town. But there is no need for it to keep on being a
confidence game in which one side proclaims its cause as neutrality and the other
side is gullible enough to believe it. Societies do face moral issues to which they
must give moral answers. The answers we arrive at through the political process in
our pluralist society are likely to be rather messy, somewhat confused and certainly
less than universally satisfactory ones. Answers nonetheless will be arrived at, and
they will have definite effects on our society. We shall play the pluralist game more
honestly, perhaps even with better results, if we admit openly what the game is
and what stakes we are playing for.
31. Pfeffer, Issues that Divide: The Triumph of Secular Humanism, 19 J. OF CHURCH & Sr. 203 (1977).
32. For a cold-bloodedly realistic assessment of what will be involved in this shift of views, see the
editorial entitled A New Ethic for Medicine and SocietY, 113 CAL. MEDICINE 67 (1970).

